๐Ÿ“‹ Microsoft Entra Documentation Changes

Changes for June 7th 2025

Period: June 6th 2025, 12:00 AM to June 7th 2025, 12:00 AM

๐Ÿ“š Historical Report: This report shows documentation changes that occurred during the 24-hour period ending on June 7th 2025.

๐Ÿ“Š Summary

40
Total Commits
1
New Files
12
Modified Files
1
Deleted Files
16
Contributors

๐Ÿ†• New Documentation Files

+181 lines added
Commit: Microsoft Entra ID Governance Licensing for Guest Users reference article.

๐Ÿ“ Modified Documentation Files

Modified by Chris Werner on Jun 6, 2025 7:21 PM
๐Ÿ“– View on learn.microsoft.com
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Commit: adding rbac, additional tweaks
Changes:
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- [Investigate insights within entitlements management](#investigate-insights-within-entitlements-management): Get quick access to information about access packages, policies, connected organizations, and catalog resources.
- [Investigate alerts in Scenario Health Monitoring](#alerts-in-scenario-health-monitoring): Analyze scenario-specific metrics, detect anomalies, and raise alerts for proactive investigation.
- [SLA in Scenario Health Monitoring](#sla-in-scenario-health-monitoring): <!--Placeholder for details on SLA in Scenario Health Monitoring.-->
- [Domains](#domains): Simplify domain management by accessing domain information, verifying DNS records, and managing domain settings using natural language queries.
- [Tenants](#tenants): Get quick access to your Microsoft Entra ID organization information, including tenant ID, display name, active licenses, and contacts.
- [Directory Roles](#directory-roles): <!--Placeholder for details on Directory Roles.-->
- [License Usage](#license-usage): Track licenses purchased and actual usage across your Microsoft Entra tenant using natural language queries.
 
 
The following roles can use this feature:
 
- Application Administrator
- IT Governance Administrator
- Privileged Role Administrator
- Identity Governance Administrator
- Conditional Access Administrator
- Security Administrator
- Hybrid Identity Administrator
- Authentication Policy Administrator
- Authentication Administrator
- [Investigate insights within entitlements management](#investigate-insights-within-entitlements-management): Get quick access to information about access packages, policies, connected organizations, and catalog resources.
- [Investigate alerts in Scenario Health Monitoring](#alerts-in-scenario-health-monitoring): Analyze scenario-specific metrics, detect anomalies, and raise alerts for proactive investigation.
- [SLA in Scenario Health Monitoring](#sla-in-scenario-health-monitoring): <!--Placeholder for details on SLA in Scenario Health Monitoring.-->
- [Microsoft Entra domains](#microsoft-entra-domains): Simplify domain management by accessing domain information, verifying DNS records, and managing domain settings using natural language queries.
- [Microsoft Entra tenants](#microsoft-entra-tenants): Get quick access to your Microsoft Entra ID organization information, including tenant ID, display name, active licenses, and contacts.
- [Directory Roles](#directory-roles): <!--Placeholder for details on Directory Roles.-->
- [License Usage](#license-usage): Track licenses purchased and actual usage across your Microsoft Entra tenant using natural language queries.
 
 
The following roles can use this feature:
 
- [Application Administrator](/entra/identity/role-based-access-control/permissions-reference#application-administrator)
- [Identity Governance Administrator](/entra/identity/role-based-access-control/permissions-reference#identity-governance-administrator)
- [Privileged Role Administrator](/entra/identity/role-based-access-control/permissions-reference#privileged-role-administrator)
- [Conditional Access Administrator](/entra/identity/role-based-access-control/permissions-reference#conditional-access-administrator)
- [Security Administrator](/entra/identity/role-based-access-control/permissions-reference#security-administrator)
- [Hybrid Identity Administrator](/entra/identity/role-based-access-control/permissions-reference#hybrid-identity-administrator)
- [Authentication Policy Administrator](/entra/identity/role-based-access-control/permissions-reference#authentication-policy-administrator)
- [Authentication Administrator](/entra/identity/role-based-access-control/permissions-reference#authentication-administrator)
 
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Commit: Public doc for CA scoping
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:::image type="content" border="true" source="./media/concept-certificate-based-authentication-technical-deep-dive/exempted.png" alt-text="Screenshot of CAs that are exempted from CRL validation." :::
 
 
## How CBA works with a Conditional Access authentication strength policy
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
:::image type="content" border="true" source="./media/concept-certificate-based-authentication-technical-deep-dive/exempted.png" alt-text="Screenshot of CAs that are exempted from CRL validation." :::
 
## Certificate Authority (CA) Scoping (Preview)
 
Certificate Authority (CA) Scoping in Microsoft Entra allows tenant administrators to restrict the use of specific certificate authorities (CAs) to defined user groups. This feature enhances the security and manageability of certificate-based authentication (CBA) by ensuring that only authorized users can authenticate using certificates issued by specific CAs.
 
CA Scoping is particularly useful in multi-PKI or B2B scenarios where multiple CAs are used across different user populations. It helps prevent unintended access and supports compliance with organizational policies.
 
**Key Benefits**
- Restrict certificate usage to specific user groups
- Support for complex PKI environments with multiple CAs
- Enhanced protection against certificate misuse or compromise
- Visibility into CA usage via sign-in logs and monitoring tools
 
CA Scoping allows admins to define rules that associate a CA (identified by its Subject Key Identifier, or SKI) with a specific Microsoft Entra group. When a user attempts to authenticate using a certificate, the system checks whether the certificateโ€™s issuing CA is scoped to a group that includes the user. Entra walks up the CA chain and applies all the scope rules until user is found in one of the groups in all the scope rules. If the user is not in the scoped group, authentication fails, even if the certificate is otherwise valid.
 
### Steps to enable CA scoping feature
 
1. Sign in to the [Microsoft Entra admin center](https://entra.microsoft.com) as at least an [Authentication Policy Administrator](../role-based-access-control/permissions-reference.md#authentication-policy-administrator).
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Commit: updates
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Microsoft Entra ID Governance utilizes Monthly Active User (MAU) licensing for guest users which is different than licensing for employees. See [Microsoft Entra ID Governance licensing fundamentals](/entra/id-governance/licensing-fundamentals) for complete details on licensing for employees.
 
Under the guest billing model, guests are identified by a userType of **Guest** regardless of where the user authenticates. A userType of **Guest** is the default userType for all B2B invitation methods and can also be set by an Identity administrator. The bill for each month will include a record for each guest user with one or more governance actions in that month. See the Azure pricing page for pricing details.
 
## Billable governance features
 
Guest users are only billed when they actively use features that are exclusive to Microsoft Entra ID Governance. Features included with Microsoft Entra P2 are not billed. Additionally, if a guest does not take any active governance-related action during a monthโ€”such as in cases where access was auto-assigned in a prior monthโ€”they will not be billed for that month.
 
You can identify actions that will be billed to the Microsoft Entra ID Governance for guests add-on by looking at your audit logs. Specifically, each billable action will have these properties included:
 
1. TargetId: object ID of the target user
 
 
1. GovernanceLicenseFeatureUsed: True
 
Below is a list of currently billable actions for **guest users**. Note that this list may change as additional features are added to Microsoft Entra ID Governance.
 
 
| Serviceโ€ฏ | Action | Billable event & API | Audit Log Where TargetUserType is Guest and GovernanceLicenseFeatureUsed is True |
 
Microsoft Entra ID Governance utilizes Monthly Active User (MAU) licensing for guest users which is different than licensing for employees. See [Microsoft Entra ID Governance licensing fundamentals](/entra/id-governance/licensing-fundamentals) for complete details on licensing for employees.
 
Under the guest billing model, guests are identified by a userType of **Guest** regardless of where the user authenticates. A userType of **Guest** is the default userType for all B2B invitation methods and can also be set by an Identity administrator. The bill for each month includes a record for each guest user with one or more governance actions in that month. See the Azure pricing page for pricing details.
 
## Billable governance features
 
Guest users are only billed when they actively use features that are exclusive to Microsoft Entra ID Governance. Features included with Microsoft Entra P2 aren't billed. Additionally, if a guest doesn't take any active governance-related action during a monthโ€”such as in cases where access was auto-assigned in a prior monthโ€”they won't be billed for that month.
 
You can identify actions that will be billed to the Microsoft Entra ID Governance for guests add-on by looking at your audit logs. Specifically, each billable action has these properties included:
 
1. TargetId: object ID of the target user
 
 
1. GovernanceLicenseFeatureUsed: True
 
The following table contains a list of currently billable actions for **guest users**. This list will change as additional features are added to Microsoft Entra ID Governance.
 
 
| Serviceโ€ฏ | Action | Billable event & API | Audit Log Where TargetUserType is Guest and GovernanceLicenseFeatureUsed is True |
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Commit: Update security best practices
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- Application ID URI
- Application ownership
 
## Redirect URI
 
It's important to keep Redirect URIs of your application up to date. Under **Authentication** for the application in the Azure portal, a platform must be selected for the application and then the **Redirect URI** property can be defined.
- If the application was configured to receive access tokens using implicit flow, but doesn't actively use them, turn off the setting to protect from misuse.
- Use separate applications for valid implicit flow scenarios.
 
## Certificates and secrets
 
Certificates and secrets, also known as credentials, are a vital part of an application when it's used as a confidential client. Under **Certificates and secrets** for the application in the Azure portal, certificates and secrets can be added or removed.
 
:::image type="content" source="./media/application-registration-best-practices/credentials.png" alt-text="Screenshot that shows where the certificates and secrets are located.":::
 
Consider the following guidance related to certificates and secrets:
 
- Always use [certificate credentials](./certificate-credentials.md) whenever possible and don't use password credentials, also known as *secrets*. While it's convenient to use password secrets as a credential, when possible use x509 certificates as the only credential type for getting tokens for an application.
- Configure [application authentication method policies](/graph/api/resources/applicationauthenticationmethodpolicy) to govern the use of secrets by limiting their lifetimes or blocking their use altogether.
- Use Key Vault with [managed identities](~/identity/managed-identities-azure-resources/overview.md) to manage credentials for an application.
- Application ID URI
- Application ownership
 
## Credentials (including certificates and secrets)
 
Credentials are a vital part of an application when it's used as a confidential client. Under the **Certificates and secrets** page for the application in the Azure portal, credentials can be added or removed.
 
:::image type="content" source="./media/application-registration-best-practices/credentials.png" alt-text="Screenshot that shows where the certificates and secrets are located.":::
 
Consider the following guidance related to certificates and secrets:
 
- Use a [managed identity](../identity/managed-identities-azure-resources/overview) as a credential whenever possible. This is strongly recommended, as managed identities are both the most secure option and don't require any ongoing credential management. Follow [this guidance](../workload-id/workload-identity-federation-config-app-trust-managed-identity) to configure a managed identity as a credential. However, this option may only be possible if your service' runs on Azure.
- If a managed identity is not possible, use [certificate credentials](./certificate-credentials.md). **Don't use password credentials, also known as *secrets***. While it's convenient to use password secrets as a credential, password credentials are often mismanaged and can be easily compromised.
- If a certificate must be used instead of a managed identity, store that certificate in a secure key vault, like [Azure Key Vault](https://azure.microsoft.com/products/key-vault)
- Configure [application management policies](/graph/api/resources/applicationauthenticationmethodpolicy) to govern the use of secrets by limiting their lifetimes or blocking their use altogether.
- If an application is used only as a public or installed client (for example, mobile or desktop apps that are installed on the end user machine), make sure that there are no credentials specified on the application object.
- Review the credentials used in applications for freshness of use and their expiration. An unused credential on an application can result in a security breach. Rollover credentials frequently and don't share credentials across applications. Don't have many credentials on one application.
- Monitor your production pipelines to prevent credentials of any kind from being committed into code repositories. [Credential Scanner](/previous-versions/azure/security/develop/security-code-analysis-overview#credential-scanner) is a static analysis tool that can be used to detect credentials (and other sensitive content) in source code and build output.
 
 
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Commit: WIP
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---
title: Troubleshooting Conditional Access policies and Security Copilot
description:
 
ms.service: entra-id
ms.subservice: conditional-access
manager: femila
ms.reviewer: lhuangnorth
---
# Troubleshooting Conditional Access policies and Security Copilot
 
[Generative Artificial Intelligence (AI)](/ai/playbook/technology-guidance/generative-ai/) services like [Microsoft Security Copilot](/copilot/security/microsoft-security-copilot) when used appropriately bring value to your organization.
 
Applying Conditional Access policy to these Generative AI services can be accomplished through [our recomendation to target all resources](concept-conditional-access-cloud-apps.md#all-resources). These policies might include those for [all users](policy-all-users-mfa-strength.md), risky [users](policy-risk-based-user.md) or [sign-ins](policy-risk-based-sign-in.md), and users with [insider risk](policy-risk-based-insider-block.md).
 
Some organizations target the following services directly using the underlying service principals and custom security attributes in their Conditional Access policies:
 
- 43d7b169-1d9e-4d32-8cd8-06c5974ed90c - Security Copilot Agent Management
- bb5ffd56-39eb-458c-a53a-775ba21277da - Security Copilot Portal
- bb3d68c2-d09e-4455-94a0-e323996dbaa3 - Security Copilot API
---
title: Troubleshoot Conditional Access policies for Security Copilot
description: Security Copilot Conditional Access - Learn to create, assign, and troubleshoot policies using custom security attributes for better protection.
 
ms.service: entra-id
ms.subservice: conditional-access
manager: femila
ms.reviewer: lhuangnorth
---
# Troubleshoot Conditional Access policies for Security Copilot
 
[Generative artificial intelligence (AI)](/ai/playbook/technology-guidance/generative-ai/) services like [Microsoft Security Copilot](/copilot/security/microsoft-security-copilot) can bring value to your organization when used appropriately.
 
Apply Conditional Access policy to these generative AI services by following [our recommendation to target all resources](concept-conditional-access-cloud-apps.md#all-resources). These policies might include those for [all users](policy-all-users-mfa-strength.md), risky [users](policy-risk-based-user.md), [sign-ins](policy-risk-based-sign-in.md), and users with [insider risk](policy-risk-based-insider-block.md).
 
Some organizations target these services directly by using the underlying service principals and custom security attributes in their Conditional Access policies:
 
- 43d7b169-1d9e-4d32-8cd8-06c5974ed90c - Security Copilot Agent Management
- bb5ffd56-39eb-458c-a53a-775ba21277da - Security Copilot Portal
- bb3d68c2-d09e-4455-94a0-e323996dbaa3 - Security Copilot API
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Commit: lightboxes added
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In entitlement management, approvers for access package requests can either be directly assigned, or determined dynamically. Entitlement management natively supports approvers when they are the requestors manager, their second-level manager, or a sponsor from a connected organization:
 
:::image type="content" source="media/entitlement-management-dynamic-approval/native-support-diagram.png" alt-text="Screenshot of native support of approvers in Entitlement management.":::
With the inclusion of [custom extensions](entitlement-management-logic-apps-integration.md) calling out to [Azure Logic Apps](/azure/logic-apps/logic-apps-overview), you're able to determine approval based on each of the [ApprovalStage properties](/graph/api/resources/approvalstage?view=graph-rest-beta#properties). For example, if the user requesting an access package is in a department where leadership has recently changed, dynamic approvals can query the system and assign the new department head as the approver.
 
:::image type="content" source="media/entitlement-management-dynamic-approval/dynamic-extensibility-diagram.png" alt-text="Screenshot of example of determining approvers using custom extensions.":::
 
This article walks you through making a custom extension, its underlying Azure Logic App, setting its system-assigned identity and role in the catalog, editing the logic app action to perform business logic, and testing to see if it runs successfully.
 
 
In entitlement management, approvers for access package requests can either be directly assigned, or determined dynamically. Entitlement management natively supports approvers when they are the requestors manager, their second-level manager, or a sponsor from a connected organization:
 
:::image type="content" source="media/entitlement-management-dynamic-approval/native-support-diagram.png" alt-text="Screenshot of native support of approvers in Entitlement management." lightbox="media/entitlement-management-dynamic-approval/native-support-diagram.png":::
With the inclusion of [custom extensions](entitlement-management-logic-apps-integration.md) calling out to [Azure Logic Apps](/azure/logic-apps/logic-apps-overview), you're able to determine approval based on each of the [ApprovalStage properties](/graph/api/resources/approvalstage?view=graph-rest-beta#properties). For example, if the user requesting an access package is in a department where leadership has recently changed, dynamic approvals can query the system and assign the new department head as the approver.
 
:::image type="content" source="media/entitlement-management-dynamic-approval/dynamic-extensibility-diagram.png" alt-text="Screenshot of example of determining approvers using custom extensions." lightbox="media/entitlement-management-dynamic-approval/dynamic-extensibility-diagram.png":::
 
This article walks you through making a custom extension, its underlying Azure Logic App, setting its system-assigned identity and role in the catalog, editing the logic app action to perform business logic, and testing to see if it runs successfully.
 
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Commit: WIP
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ms.service: entra-id
ms.subservice: conditional-access
ms.topic: troubleshooting
ms.date: 03/04/2025
 
ms.author: joflore
author: MicrosoftGuyJFlo
1. **Conditional Access** to see policy failure and success. Scope your filter to show only failures to limit results.
1. **Username** to see information related to specific users.
1. **Date** scoped to the time frame in question.
 
![Screenshot showing selecting the Conditional Access filter in the sign-in log.](./media/troubleshoot-conditional-access/image3.png)
 
 
ms.service: entra-id
ms.subservice: conditional-access
ms.topic: troubleshooting
ms.date: 06/06/2025
 
ms.author: joflore
author: MicrosoftGuyJFlo
1. **Conditional Access** to see policy failure and success. Scope your filter to show only failures to limit results.
1. **Username** to see information related to specific users.
1. **Date** scoped to the time frame in question.
1. **Resource** to see information related to the resurce called.
 
![Screenshot showing selecting the Conditional Access filter in the sign-in log.](./media/troubleshoot-conditional-access/image3.png)
 
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Commit: Learn Editor: Update reference-sla-performance.md
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| April | 99.999% | 99.999% | 99.999% | 99.999% | 99.999%*|
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| April | 99.999% | 99.999% | 99.999% | 99.999% | 99.999%*|
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Modified by Barclay Neira on Jun 6, 2025 3:32 AM
๐Ÿ“– View on learn.microsoft.com
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Commit: Update docs/includes/secure-recommendations/21818.md
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# userimpact: Low
# implementationcost: Medium
---
Organizations without proper activation alerts for highly privileged roles lack visibility into when these critical permissions are exercised. Threat actors can exploit this monitoring gap to perform privilege escalation by activating highly privileged roles without detection, then establish persistence through administrative account creation or security policy modifications. The absence of real-time alerting enables attackers to conduct lateral movement, modify audit configurations, and disable security controls without triggering immediate response procedures.
 
**Remediation action**
 
# userimpact: Low
# implementationcost: Medium
---
Organizations without proper activation alerts for highly privileged roles lack visibility into when users access these critical permissions. Threat actors can exploit this monitoring gap to perform privilege escalation by activating highly privileged roles without detection, then establish persistence through admin account creation or security policy modifications. The absence of real-time alerts enables attackers to conduct lateral movement, modify audit configurations, and disable security controls without triggering immediate response procedures.
 
**Remediation action**
 
Modified by Barclay Neira on Jun 6, 2025 3:32 AM
๐Ÿ“– View on learn.microsoft.com
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Commit: Update docs/includes/secure-recommendations/21912.md
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# userimpact: Low
# implementationcost: Medium
---
Azure Logic Apps integrated with Microsoft Entra Identity Governance create a significant attack surface when access controls are inadequate. Threat actors can exploit misaligned permissions between Logic Apps management roles and Entra directory roles to gain initial access through compromised accounts with excessive Azure RBAC permissions. Once accessed, threat actors can modify workflow logic to insert malicious automation into provisioning processes, then use managed identities and existing connections for lateral movement across connected systems.
 
**Remediation action**
 
# userimpact: Low
# implementationcost: Medium
---
Azure Logic Apps integrated with Microsoft Entra Identity Governance create a significant attack surface when access controls are inadequate. Threat actors can exploit misaligned permissions between Logic Apps management roles and Microsoft Entra directory roles to gain initial access through compromised accounts with excessive Azure RBAC permissions. With access, threat actors can modify workflow logic to insert malicious automation into provisioning processes, then use managed identities and existing connections for lateral movement across connected systems.
 
**Remediation action**
 
Modified by Alexander Filipin on Jun 6, 2025 2:51 AM
๐Ÿ“– View on learn.microsoft.com
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Commit: Update cross-tenant-access-overview.md
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- If you block access to all apps by default, users are unable to read emails encrypted with Microsoft Rights Management Service, also known as Office 365 Message Encryption (OME). To avoid this issue, we recommend configuring your outbound settings to allow your users to access this app ID: 00000012-0000-0000-c000-000000000000. If you allow only this application, access to all other apps is blocked by default.
 
- If an organization requires MFA or Terms of Use (ToU) by Conditional Access policies, users might be blocked from registering MFA methods or consenting to ToU. To avoid this issue, configure outbound settings (home tenant) and inbound settings (resource tenant) to let users access app ID 0000000c-0000-0000-c000-000000000000 (Microsoft App Access Panel) for MFA registration and app ID d52792f4-ba38-424d-8140-ada5b883f293 (AAD Terms of Use) for ToU. The configuration of the outbound settings can be achieved via the Microsoft Entra admin center by selecting **Add other applications** and providing the app ID. Due to a current user interface (UI) limitation the configuration of the inbound settings must be performed via [Microsoft Graph APIs](/graph/api/resources/crosstenantaccesspolicy-overview).
 
## Custom roles for managing cross-tenant access settings
<!--Added content as a reference. -->
 
- If you block access to all apps by default, users are unable to read emails encrypted with Microsoft Rights Management Service, also known as Office 365 Message Encryption (OME). To avoid this issue, we recommend configuring your outbound settings to allow your users to access this app ID: 00000012-0000-0000-c000-000000000000. If you allow only this application, access to all other apps is blocked by default.
 
- If an organization requires MFA or Terms of Use (ToU) by Conditional Access policies, users might be blocked from registering MFA methods or consenting to ToU. To avoid this issue, configure outbound settings (home tenant) and inbound settings (resource tenant) to let users access app ID 0000000c-0000-0000-c000-000000000000 (Microsoft App Access Panel) for MFA registration and app ID d52792f4-ba38-424d-8140-ada5b883f293 (AAD Terms of Use) for ToU. The configuration of the outbound settings can be achieved via the Microsoft Entra admin center by selecting 'Add other applications' and providing the app ID. Due to a current user interface (UI) limitation the configuration of the inbound settings must be performed via [Microsoft Graph APIs](/graph/api/resources/crosstenantaccesspolicy-overview).
 
## Custom roles for managing cross-tenant access settings
<!--Added content as a reference. -->
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Commit: 'Personal Microsoft accounts only' cannot be an option.md
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1. Sign in to the [Microsoft Entra admin center](https://entra.microsoft.com) as at least a [Cloud Application Administrator](~/identity/role-based-access-control/permissions-reference.md#cloud-application-administrator).
1. Browse to **Entra ID** > **App registrations** then select **New registration**.
1. Name the application, for example *ContosoApp*.
1. Under **Supported account types**, select _Personal Microsoft accounts only_.
1. Under **Redirect URI**, select **Web** and enter your populated redirect URI explained [here](/entra/external-id/customers/how-to-custom-oidc-federation-customers#set-up-your-openid-connect-identity-provider)
1. Select **Register**.
 
1. Sign in to the [Microsoft Entra admin center](https://entra.microsoft.com) as at least a [Cloud Application Administrator](~/identity/role-based-access-control/permissions-reference.md#cloud-application-administrator).
1. Browse to **Entra ID** > **App registrations** then select **New registration**.
1. Name the application, for example *ContosoApp*.
1. Under **Supported account types**, select _Accounts in any organizational directory (Any Microsoft Entra ID tenant - Multitenant) and personal Microsoft accounts (e.g. Skype, Xbox)_.
1. Under **Redirect URI**, select **Web** and enter your populated redirect URI explained [here](/entra/external-id/customers/how-to-custom-oidc-federation-customers#set-up-your-openid-connect-identity-provider)
1. Select **Register**.
 

๐Ÿ—‘๏ธ Deleted Documentation Files

DELETED docs/identity/conditional-access/policy-all-users-security-copilot.md
Deleted by John Flores on Jun 6, 2025 11:59 PM
๐Ÿ“– Was available at: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/conditional-access/policy-all-users-security-copilot
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Commit: WIP